Exorcising Spectres with secure compilers by Patrignani, Marco & Guarnieri, Marco
Exorcising Spectres with Secure Compilers
Marco Patrignani
∗








Attackers can access sensitive information of programs by exploit-
ing the side-effects of speculatively-executed instructions using
Spectre attacks. To mitigate these attacks, popular compilers de-
ployed a wide range of countermeasures whose security, however,
has not been ascertained: while some are believed to be secure,
others are known to be insecure and result in vulnerable programs.
This paper develops formal foundations for reasoning about the
security of these defenses. For this, it proposes a framework of se-
cure compilation criteria that characterise when compilers produce
code resistant against Spectre v1 attacks. With this framework, this
paper performs a comprehensive security analysis of countermea-
sures against Spectre v1 attacks implemented in major compilers,
deriving the first security proofs of said countermeasures.
This paper uses a blue, sans-serif font for elements of the source language
and an orange, bold font for elements of the target language. Elements
common to all languages are typeset in a black, italic font (to avoid
repetitions). For a better experience, please print or view this in colour [48].
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1 INTRODUCTION
By predicting the outcome of branching (and other) instructions,
CPUs can trigger speculative execution and speed up computation
by executing code based on such predictions. When predictions
are incorrect, CPUs roll back the effects of speculatively-executed
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instructions on the architectural state, i.e., memory, flags, and reg-
isters. However, they do not roll back effects on microarchitectural
components like caches.
Exploiting microarchitectural leaks caused by speculative execu-
tion leads to Spectre attacks [35, 37, 38, 41, 57]. Compilers support
a number of countermeasures, e.g., the insertion of lfence specu-
lation barriers [31] and speculative load hardening [16], that can
mitigate leaks introduced by speculation over branch instructions
like those exploited in the Spectre v1 attack [37].
Existing countermeasures, however, are often developed in an
unprincipled way, that is, they are not proven to be secure, and
some of them fail in blocking speculative leaks, i.e., leaks introduced
by speculatively-executed instructions. For instance, the Microsoft
Visual C++ compiler misplaces speculation barriers, thereby pro-
ducing programs that are still vulnerable to Spectre attacks [27, 36].
In this paper, we propose a novel secure compilation framework
for reasoning about speculative execution attacks and we use it
to provide the first precise characterization of security for a com-
prehensive class of compiler countermeasures against Spectre v1
attacks. Let us now discuss our contributions more in detail:
▶ We present a secure compilation framework tailored towards
reasoning about speculative execution attacks (Section 2). The dis-
tinguishing feature of our framework is that compilers translate
programs from a source language L, with a standard imperative
semantics, into a target language T equipped with a speculative
semantics capturing the effects of speculatively-executed instruc-
tions. This matches a programmer’s mental model: programmers
do not think about speculative execution when writing source code
(and they should not!) since speculation only exists in processors (
captured by T’s speculative semantics). It is the duty of a (secure)
compiler to ensure the features of T cannot be exploited.
Our framework encompasses two different security models for spec-
ulative execution: (1) (Strong) speculative non-interference [27] (SNI),
which considers all leaks derived from speculatively-executed in-
structions as harmful, and (2)Weak speculative non-interference [28],
which considers harmful only leaks of speculatively-accessed data.
▶ We introduce speculative safety (SS, Section 3), a novel safety
property that implies the absence of classes of speculative leaks.
The key features of SS are that (1) it is parametric in a taint-tracking
mechanism, which we leverage to reason about security by focusing
on single traces, and (2) it is formulated to simplify proving that a
compiler preserves it. We instantiate SS using two different taint-
tracking mechanisms obtaining strong SS and weak SS. We precisely
characterize the security guarantees of SS by showing that strong
(resp. weak) SS over-approximates strong (resp. weak) SNI.
▶ We define two novel secure compilation criteria: Robust Spec-
ulative Safety Preservation (RSSP) and Robust Speculative Non-Inter-
ference Preservation (RSNIP , Section 4). These criteria respectively
ensure that compilers preserve (strong or weak) SS and SNI robustly,
i.e, even when linked against arbitrary (potentially malicious) code.
Satisfying these criteria implies that compilers correctly place coun-
termeasures to prevent speculative leaks. However, RSSP requires
preserving a safety property (SS) and it is simpler to prove than
RSNIP , which requires preserving a hyperproperty [20]. To the
best of our knowledge, these are the first criteria that concretely
instantiate a recent theory that phrases security of compilers as
the preservation of (hyper)properties [3, 4, 51] to reason about a
concrete security property, that is, the absence of speculative leaks.
▶ Using our framework, we perform a comprehensive secu-
rity analysis of countermeasures against Spectre v1 attacks imple-
mented in major C compilers (Section 5). Specifically, we focus on
(1) automated insertion of lfences (implemented in the Microsoft
Visual C++ and the Intel ICC compilers [33, 47]), and (2) speculative
load hardening (SLH, implemented in Clang [16]). We prove that:
– The Microsoft Visual C++ implementation of (1) violates weak
RSNIP and is thus insecure.
– The Intel ICC implementation of (1) provides strong RSNIP , so
compiled programs have no speculative leaks.
– SLH provides weak RSNIP , so compiled programs do not leak
speculatively-accessed data. This prevents Spectre-style attacks,
but compiled programs might still speculatively leak data ac-
cessed non-speculatively.
– The non-interprocedural variant of SLH violates weak RSNIP
and is thus insecure.
– Our novel variant of SLH, called strong SLH, provides strong
RSNIP and blocks all speculative leaks.
All our security proofs follow a common methodology (see Sec-
tion 4.3) whose key insight is that proving a countermeasure to be
RSSP is sufficient to ensure its security since SS over-approximates
SNI. This allows us to leverage SS to simplify our proofs.
We conclude by discussing limitations and extensions of our ap-
proach (Section 6) and related work (Section 7).
For simplicity, we only discuss key aspects of our formal models.
Full details and proofs are in the companion report [52].
2 MODELLING SPECULATIVE EXECUTION
To illustrate our speculative execution model, we first introduce
Spectre v1 (Listing 1). Using that, we define the threat model that we
consider (Section 2.1). Then, we present the syntax of our languages
(Section 2.2) and their trace model (Section 2.3). This is followed by
the operational semantics of our languages (Section 2.4). Next, we
present the source (non-speculative) trace semantics (Section 2.5)
and the target (speculative) trace semantics (Section 2.6). This for-
malisation focuses on the strong SNI model, so we conclude by
defining the changes necessary for weak SNI (Section 2.7).
1 void get (int y)
2 if (y < size) then
3 temp = B[A[y]∗512]
Listing 1: The classic Spectre v1 snippet.
Consider the standard Spectre v1 example [37] in Listing 1. Func-
tion get checks whether the index stored in variable y is less than
the size of array A, stored in the global variable size. If so, the
program retrieves A[y], multiplies it by the cache line size (here:
512), and uses the result to access array B. If size is not cached,
modern processors predict the guard’s outcome and speculatively
continue the execution. Thus, line 3 might be executed even if y ≥
size. When size becomes available, the processor checks whether
the prediction was correct. If not, it rolls back all changes to the
architectural state and executes the correct branch. However, the
speculatively-executed memory accesses leave a footprint in the
cache, which enables an attacker to retrieve A[y] even for y ≥ size.
2.1 Threat Model
We study compiler countermeasures that translate source programs
into (hardened) target programs. In our setting, an attacker is an
arbitrary program at target level that is linked against a (compiled)
partial program of interest. The partial program (or, component)
stores sensitive information in a private heap that the attacker
cannot access. For this, we assume that attacker and component
run on separate processes and OS-level memory protection restricts
access to the private heap. For example, in Listing 1, the array A
would be stored in the private heap and the attacker is code that
runs before and after function get.
While attackers cannot directly access the private heap, they can
mount confused deputy attacks [29, 54] to trick components into
leaking sensitive information despite the memory protection.We
focus on preventing only speculative leaks, i.e., those caused by
speculatively-executed instructions. For this, our attacker can ob-
serve the program counter and the locations of memory accesses
during program execution. This attacker model is commonly used
to formalise code that has no timing side-channels [8, 44] without
requiring microarchitectural models. Following Guarnieri et al. [27],
we capture this model in our semantics through traces that record
the address of all memory accesses (e.g., the address of B[A[y]∗512]
in Listing 1) and the outcome of all control-flow instructions.
Tomodel the effects of speculative execution, our target language
mispredicts the outcome of all branch instructions in the component.
This is the worst-case scenario in terms of leakage regardless of
how attackers poison the branch predictor [27].
2.2 Languages L and T
Technically, we have a pair of source and target languages (L and T)
for studying security in the strong SNI model and a pair of source
and target languages (L- and T-) for studying weak SNI. Strong (L-T)
and weak (L--T-) languages have the same syntax and a very similar
semantics, which differ only in the security-relevant observations
produced during the computation. We focus this section and the
following ones on the strong languages L-T; we introduce the small
changes for the weak languages L--T- in Section 2.7.
The source (L) and target (T) languages are single-threadedWhile
languageswith a heap, a stack to lookup local variables, and a notion
of components (our unit of compilation). We focus on such a setting,
instead of an assembly-style language like [17, 27], to reason about
speculative leaks without getting bogged down in complications
like unstructured control flow. This does not limit the power of
attackers: since attackers reside in another process, they would not
be able to exploit the additional features of assembly languages
(e.g., unstructured control flow) to compromise components.
The common syntax of L and T is presented below; we indicate
sequences of elements e1, · · · , en as e and e · e denotes a stack with
top element e and rest of the stack e.
ProgramsW , P ::= H , F , I Codebase C ::= F , I Imports I ::= f
Functions F ::= f (x) 7→ s; return; Attackers A ::= H , F [·]
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H ; n 7→ v where n ∈ Z
Expressions e ::= x | v | e ⊕ e Values v ::= n ∈ N
Statements s ::= skip | s; s | let x = e in s | call f e | e := e
| e :=pr e | let x = rd e in s | let x = rdpr e in s
| ifz e then s else s | let x = e (if e) in s | lfence
We model components, i.e., partial programs (P), and attackers (A).
A (partial) program P defines its heap H , a list of functions F , and a
list of imports I , which are all the functions an attacker can define.
An attacker A just defines its heap and its functions. We indicate
the code base of a program (its functions and imports) as C.
Functions are untyped, and their bodies are sequences of state-
ments s that include standard instructions: skipping, sequencing,
let-bindings, function calls, writing the public and the private heap,
reading the public and private heap, conditional branching, condi-
tional assignments and speculation barriers. Statements can contain
expressions e, which include program variables x, natural numbers
n, arithmetic and comparison operators ⊕. Heaps H map memory
addresses n ∈ Z to values v. Heaps are partitioned in a public part
(when the domain n ≥ 0) and a private part (if n < 0). An attacker
A can only define and access the public heap. A program P defines
a private heap and it can access both private and public heaps.
2.3 Labels and Traces
Computation steps in L and T are labelled with labels λ, which
can be the empty label ϵ , an action α? or α ! recording the control-
flow between attacker and code (as required for secure compilation
proofs [2, 4, 49, 51]), or a µarch. action δ capturing what a microar-
chitectural attacker can observe.
µarch. Acts. δ ::= read(n) | write(n) | read(n 7→ v)
| write(n 7→ v) | if(v) | rlb
Actions α ::= call f v | ret v Labels λ ::= ϵ | α? | α ! | δ
Action call f v? represents a call to a function f in the com-
ponent with value v . Dually, call f v! represents a call(back) to
the attacker with value v . Action ret! represents a return to the
attacker and ret? a return(back) to the component.
The read(n) and write(n) actions denote respectively read and
write accesses to the private heap location n. Dually, the read(n 7→ v)
and write(n 7→ v) actions denote respectively read and write ac-
cesses to the public heap location n where v is the value read
from/written to memory. In these actions, locations n model leaks
through the data cache whereas values v, which only appear in
operations on the public heap, model that attackers have access to
the public heap. In contrast, the if(v) action denotes the outcome
of branch instructions and the rlb action indicates the roll-back
of speculatively-executed instructions. These actions implicitly ex-
pose which instruction we are currently executing, and thus the
instruction cache content.
Traces λ are sequences of labels. The semantics only track µarch.
actions executed inside the component P , whereas those executed in
the attacker-controlled context A are ignored (Rule E-L-single later
on). The reason is that µarch. actions produced by A can be safely
ignored since A cannot access the private heap (this is analogous
to other robust safety works [23, 25, 40, 60]).
2.4 Operational Semantics for L and T
Both languages are given a labelled operational semantics that
describes how statements execute. This semantics is defined in
terms of program states C,H ,B ▷ (s)f that consist of a codebase C,
a heap H , a stack of local variables B, a statement s, and a stack of
function names f . C is used to look up function bodies, whereas
function names f , which we often omit for simplicity, are used to
infer if the code that is executing comes from the attacker or from
the component, and this determines the produced labels.
Bindings B ::= ∅ | B; x 7→ v Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ,B ▷ (s)f
Both L and T have a big-step operational semantics for ex-
pressions and a small-step, structural operational semantics for
statements that generates labels. The former follows judgements
B ▷ e ↓ v meaning: “according to variables B, expression e reduces
to value v.” The latter follows judgements Ω
λ
−−→ Ω′ meaning:
“state Ω reduces in one step to Ω′ emitting label λ.”
We remark that values are computed as expected (though we
use 0 for true in ifz statements; see Rule E-if-true) and expressions
access only local variables in B (reading from the heap is treated as
a statement); therefore, we omit the expression semantics. Similarly,
many of the rules for the statement semantics are standard and thus
omitted; the most illustrative ones are given below. We use |n | for
the absolute value of n and H (n) to look up the binding for n in H .
(E-if-true)
B ▷ e ↓ 0
C,H ,B · B ▷ ifz e then s else s′
(if(0))
−−−−−−−→ C,H ,B · B ▷ s
(E-read-prv)
B ▷ e ↓ n H (−|n|) = v
C,H ,B · B ▷ let x = rdpr e in s
read(−|n |)
−−−−−−−−−−→
C,H ,B · B ∪ x 7→ v ▷ s
(E-write-prv)
B ▷ e ↓ n H = H1;−|n| 7→ v′;H2
B ▷ e′ ↓ v H ′ = H1;−|n| 7→ v;H2
C,H ,B · B ▷ e :=pr e′
write(−|n |)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ C,H ′,B · B ▷ skip
The rules of conditionals, read, and write emit the related µarch. ac-
tions (from Section 2.3). Specifically, conditionals produce obser-
vations recording the outcome of the condition (Rule E-if-true),
whereas memory operations produce observations recording the
accessed memory address (Rule E-read-prv and Rule E-write-prv).
2.5 Non-speculative Semantics for L
We now define the non-speculative semantics of L, which describes
how (whole) programs behave when executed on a processor with-
out speculative execution. A component P and an attacker A can
be linked to obtain a whole programW ≡ A [P] that contains the
functions and heaps of A and P . Only whole programs can run, and
a program is whole only if it defines all functions that are called
and if the attacker defines all the functions in the interfaces of P .
For this, we define the big-step semantics =⇒ of L, which con-
catenates single steps (defined by→) into multiple ones and single
labels into traces. The judgement Ω
λ
==⇒ Ω′ is read: “state Ω emits
trace λ and becomes Ω′”. The most interesting rule is below. As
mentioned in Section 2.3, the trace does not contain µarch. ac-
tions performed by the attacker (see the ‘then’ branch, recall that
functions in I are defined by the attacker).
(E-L-single)
Ω ≡ F, I,H,B ▷ (s)f ·f Ω
′ ≡ F, I,H′,B′ ▷ (s′)f′ ·f′
Ω
α




Finally, the behaviour Beh(W) of a whole programW is the trace
λ generated from the =⇒ semantics starting from the initial state of
W (indicated as Ω0 (W)) until termination. Intuitively, a program’s
initial state is the main function, which is defined by the attacker.
Example 2.1 ( L trace for Listing 1). Consider size=4. Trace tns
indicates a valid execution of the code in L (without speculation).
tns = call get 0? · if(0) · read(nA) · read(nB + v
0
A) · ret!
We indicate the addresses of arrays A and B in the L heap with
nA and nB respectively and the value stored at A[i] with viA. 
2.6 Speculative Semantics for T
Our semantics for T models the effects of speculatively-executed
instructions. This semantics is inspired by the “always mispredict”
semantics of Guarnieri et al. [27], which captures the worst-case
scenario (from an information theoretic perspective) independently
of the branch prediction outcomes. Whenever the semantics ex-
ecutes a branch instruction, it first mis-speculates by executing
the wrong branch for a fixed number w of steps (called speculation
window). After speculating for w steps, the speculative execution
is terminated, the changes to the program state are rolled back,
and the semantics restarts by executing the correct branch. The
µarch. effects of speculatively-executed instructions are recorded
on the trace as actions.
Speculative program states (Σ) are defined as stacks of specula-
tion instances (Φ = (Ω,w)), each one recording the program state Ω
and the remaining speculation windoww. The speculation window
is a natural number n or ⊥ when no speculation is happening; its
maximum length is a global constantω that depends on physical
characteristics of the CPU like the size of the reorder buffer.
Speculative States Σ ::= Φ Speculation Instance Φ ::= (Ω,w)
The execution of programW starts in state (Ω0 (W) ,⊥), i.e., in the
same initial state that L starts in.
In the small-step operational semantics Φ λ Φ′, reductions hap-
pen at the top of the stack:
(E-T-speculate-if)




−−−→ Ω′ C ≡ F; I f < I j = min (ω,n)
if B ▷ e ↓ 0 then Ω′′ ≡ C,H,B · B ▷ s′′′; s′
else Ω′′ ≡ C,H,B · B ▷ s′′; s′




−−→ Ω′ Ω ≡ C,H,B ▷ (s; s′)f ·f
(s . ifz · · · and s . lfence) or (C ≡ F; I and f ∈ I)





Ω ≡ C,H,B ▷ s; s′
s ≡ lfence
Φ · (Ω,n + 1) ϵ Φ · (Ω′, 0)
(E-T-speculate-rollback)
n = 0 or Ω is stuck
Φ · (Ω,n) rlb Φ
Executing a statement updates the program state on top of the
state and reduces the speculation window by 1 (Rule E-T-speculate-
action). Mis-speculation pushes the mis-speculating state on top
of the stack (Rule E-T-speculate-if). Note that speculation does
not happen in attacker code (condition f < I, recall that f is the
function executing now and I are all attacker-defined functions).
This is without loss of generality since (1) attackers cannot directly
access the private heap, and (2) our security definitions (Section 3)
will consider any possible attacker, so the speculative behavior of
an attacker (i.e., the speculative execution of the ‘wrong branch’)
will be captured by another one who has the same branches but
inverted (e.g., the ‘then’ code of one attacker is the ‘else’ code of
another). When the speculation window is exhausted (or if the
speculation reaches a stuck state), speculation ends and the top of
the stack is popped (Rule E-T-speculate-rollback). The role of the
lfence instruction is setting to zero the speculation window, so that
rollbacks are triggered (Rule E-T-speculate-lfence).
As before, the behaviour Beh(W) of a whole programW is the
trace λ generated, according to the =⇒ semantics, starting from
the initial state ofW until termination.
Example 2.2 (T Trace for Listing 1). Consider the same setting
as Example 2.1. Trace tsp is a valid execution of the code in T, and
therefore with speculation. As before, we indicate the addresses
of arrays A and B in the source and target heaps with nA and nB
respectively and the value stored at A[i] with viA.
tsp = call get 8? · if(1) · read(nA + 8) ·read(nB + v8A) · rlb · ret!
Differently from tns in Example 2.1, trace tsp contains specula-
tively executed instructions whose side effects are represented by
the actions read(nA + 8) and read(nB + v8A). 
2.7 Weak Languages L- and T-
To conclude, we now introduce the weak languages L- andT-, which
we use to study security in the weak SNI model. Following [28],
these languages differ from L and T in a single aspect, that is, in
the actions produced by memory reads. Specifically, in L- and T-,
non-speculatively reading from the private heap produces an action
read(n 7→ v) that contains the read value v as well as the accessed
memory address n. As we show next, this difference allows us to
precisely characterize only the leaks of transiently loaded data,
which are exactly those leaks exploited in speculative disclosure
gadgets like Listing 1, rather than all speculative leak.
3 SECURITY DEFINITIONS FOR SECURE
SPECULATION
We now present semantic security definitions against speculative
leaks. We start by presenting (robust) speculative non-interference
(RSNI, Section 3.1). Next, we introduce (robust) speculative safety
(RSS, Section 3.2). These definitions can be applied to programs in
the four languages L, T, L-, and T-. Therefore, we write RSNI(L) and
RSS(L) to indicate which language L the definitions are referring to.
Since these languages have the same syntax but different semantics,
we also study the relationships between RSNI and RSS for weak
and strong languages. We depict these results below (only for T
and T- since all security definitions trivially hold for the source







Theorem 3.12 Theorem 3.5
most secure
least secure
least precise most precise
3.1 Robust Speculative Non-Interference
Speculative non-interference (SNI) is a class of security proper-
ties [27, 28] that is based on comparing the information leaked
by instructions executed speculatively and non-speculatively. SNI
requires that speculatively-executed instructions do not leak more
information than what is leaked by executing the program without
speculative execution, which is obtained by ignoring observations
produced speculatively. Hence, SNI semantically characterize the
information leaks that are introduced by speculative execution, that
is, those leaks that are exploited in Spectre-style attacks.
Property. Here, we instantiate robust speculative non-interference
in our framework by following SNI’s trace-based characteriza-
tion [27, Proposition 1]. Thus we need to introduce two concepts:
• SNI is parametric in a policy denoting sensitive information.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, we assume that only the private heap
is sensitive. Hence, whole programs W and W ′ are low-equivalent,
writtenW ′ =LW , if they differ only in their private heaps.
• SNI requires comparing the leakage resulting from non-spec-
ulative and speculative instructions. The non-speculative projection
t↾nse [27] of a trace t extracts the observations associated with non-
speculatively-executed instructions. We obtain t↾nse by removing
from t all sub-strings enclosed between if(v) and rlb observa-
tions. We illustrate this using an example: ·↾nse applied to tsp from
Example 2.2 produces tsp↾nse= call get 8? · if(1) · ret!.
We now formalise SNI. A whole programW is SNI if its traces
do not leak more than their non-speculative projections. That is, if
an attacker can distinguish the traces produced by W and a low-
equivalent program W ′, the distinguishing observation must be
made by an instruction that does not result from mis-speculation.
Definition 3.1 (Speculative Non-Interference (SNI)).
⊢ W : SNI def= ∀W ′. ifW ′ =LW













A component P is robustly speculatively non-interferent if it is
SNI no matter what valid attacker it is linked to (Definition 3.2),
where an attacker A is valid (⊢ A : atk) if it does not define a private
heap and does not contain instructions to read and write it.
Definition 3.2 (Robust Speculative Non-Interference (RSNI)).
⊢ P : RSNI def= ∀A. if ⊢ A : atk then ⊢ A [P] : SNI
Example 3.3 (Listing 1 is RSNI in L and not in T). Consider the
code of Listing 1. As expected, this code is RSNI in L. Indeed, L does
not support speculative execution and, therefore, for any trace tns
produced by an L-program tns↾nse= tns.
The same code, however, is not RSNI in T. Consider the code of
Listing 1 (indicated as P1) and an attacker A8 that calls function
get with 8. Since array A is in the private heap, the low-equivalent
program required by Definition 3.1 is the same A8 linked with some
PN, which is the same P1 with some array Nwith contents different
from A in the heap such that A[8],N[8]. Whole program A8 [P1]
generates trace tsp from Example 2.2 while A8 [PN] generates t′sp
below. We indicate the address of array N as nN and the content
of N[i] as viN. Low-equivalence yields that addresses are the same
(nA + 8 = nN + 8) but contents are not (v8A , v
8
N), and thus B is
accessed at different offsets (nB + v8A , nB + v
8
N).
t′sp = call get 8? · if(1) · read(nN + 8) · read(nB + v
8
N) · rlb · ret!
Listing 1 is not RSNI inT (and neither inT-) since the non-speculative
projections of t′sp and of tsp are the same (see above) while t′sp and
tsp are different (read(nB + v8A) , read(nB + v
8
N)). 
Security Guarantees. Since RSNI is defined in terms of traces, its
security guarantees depend on which of the four languages L, T, L-,
and T- we consider. As expected, for the source languages L and L-,
RSNI is trivially satisfied; there is no speculative execution in L and
L- and all traces are identical to their non-speculative projections.
Theorem 3.4 (All L and L- programs are RSNI).
∀P. ⊢ P : RSNI(L) and ⊢ P : RSNI(L-)
For the target languages T and T-, which support speculative
execution, RSNI provides different security guarantees.
RSNI(T) corresponds to speculative non-interference [27, 28],
which ensures the absence of all speculative leaks. In our setting,
the only allowed leaks are those depending either on information
from the public heap or information from the private heap that is
disclosed through actions produced non-speculatively, e.g., as an
address of a non-speculative memory access. Any other speculative
leak of information from the private heap is disallowed by RSNI(T).
RSNI(T-), in contrast, corresponds to weak speculative non-
interference [28], which allows speculative leaks of information that
has been retrieved non-speculatively. Indeed, in T- non-speculative
reads from the private heap produce actions read(n 7→ v) that ad-
ditionally disclose the value v read from the heap as part of the non-
speculative projection. As a result, data retrieved non-speculatively
from the private heap can influence speculative actions, which are
not part of the non-speculative projection of the trace, without
violating RSNI(T-). That is, RSNI(T-) ensures the absence only of
leaks of speculatively-accessed data.
Since RSNI(T) ensures the absence of all speculative leaks while
RSNI(T-) only ensures the absence of some of them, any RSNI(T)
program is also RSNI(T-).
Theorem 3.5 (RSNI(T) Implies RSNI(T-)).
∀P. if ⊢ P : RSNI(T) then ⊢ P : RSNI(T-)
As shown in [28], strong and weak speculative non-interference
(that is, RSNI(T) and RSNI(T-)) have different implications for se-
cure programming. In particular, programs that are traditionally
constant-time (i.e., constant-time under the non-speculative se-
mantics) and satisfy strong speculative non-interference are also
constant-time w.r.t. the speculative semantics. Similarly, programs
that are traditionally sandboxed (i.e., do not access out-of-the-
sandbox data non-speculatively) and satisfy weak speculative non-
interference are also sandboxed w.r.t. the speculative semantics.
3.2 Robust Speculative Safety
We now introduce speculative safety (SS), a safety property that
soundly over-approximates SNI. To enable reasoning about secu-
rity using single traces (rather than pairs of traces as in SNI), we
extend our languages with a taint-tracking mechanism that (1)
taints values as “safe” (denoted by S) whenever they can be leaked
speculatively without violating SNI (e.g., the public heap is “safe”)
or “unsafe” (denoted by U ) otherwise, and (2) propagates taints to
labels across computations. Speculatively safe programs produce
traces containing only safe labels.
Taint tracking Taint-tracking is at the foundation of our speculative
safety definition and it enables reasoning about security on single
traces. For this, we extend the semantics of our languages L, L-, T,
and T- with a taint tracking mechanism. We consider two taint-
tracking mechanisms, a strong and a weak one, that lead to different
security guarantees, as we show later. Each mechanism is adopted
in the related pair of languages: strong (resp. weak) languages
use the strong (resp. weak) taint-tracking. Our taint-tracking is
rather standard, so we provide an informal overview of its key
features below using the rules for reading from the private heap as
an example; full details are Appendix A. These rules simply extend
Rule E-read-prv with taint, which is highlighted in gray.
(T-read-prv)
B ▷ e ↓ n : σ ′ H (−|n |) = v : σ ′′ σ = σ ′′ ⊓σ ′




C, H, B · B ∪ x 7→ v : U ▷ s
(T-read-prv-weak)
B ▷ e ↓ n : σ ′ H (−|n |) = v : σ ′′ σ = σ ′′ ⊓σ ′




C, H, B · B ∪ x 7→ v : σ ′ ⊔σpc ▷ s
• All values v are tainted with a taint σ ∈ {S,U }. Heaps H
and variable bindings B are extended to record the taint of values.
Taints form the usual integrity lattice S ≤ U (which is the dual of
the lattice used for non-interference) and are combined using the
least-upper-bound (⊓) and greatest-lower-bound (⊔) operators. For
simplicity, we report here the key cases: S ⊓U = U and S ⊔U = S .
• The public part of the initial heap is tainted as safe, and its
private part is tainted as unsafe.
• The taint-tracking mechanism also tracks the taint σpc asso-
ciated with the program counter. The program counter taint is S
whenever we are not speculating and it is raised to U whenever we
are executing instructions speculatively. The latter can happen only
in the T and T- languages, where it is represented by the speculative
state containing more than one speculation instance. In the source
languages, instead, σpc is always S.
• Taint is propagated in the standard way across computations.
For example, expressions combine taints using the least-upper-
bound ⊓, i.e., expressions involving unsafe values are tainted U .
The strong and weak taint-tracking mechanisms differ, however,
in how they handle memory reads from the private heap. When
reading from the private heap, the strong mechanism used in L and
T taints the variable where the data is stored as unsafe (U ) (Rule T-
read-prv). In contrast, the weak mechanism of L- and T-, taints the
target value with the greatest-lower-bound of the taints of the mem-
ory address and of the program counter (Rule T-read-prv-weak).
This ensures that information retrieved non-speculatively from the
private heap (i.e., the program counter taint is S) is tainted S.
• The taint tracking does not keep track of implicit flows. Since
the program counter is part of the actions, any sensitive implicit flow
would appear in the trace due to the corresponding if(v) action.
• The taint of labels is the greatest-lower-bound of the taint
of the expressions generating the label and the program counter
taint (Rule T-read-prv and Rule T-read-prv-weak). This ensures
that non-speculative labels are tainted as safe (S), while speculative
labels are tainted as unsafe (U ) if they depend on unsafe data and
safe otherwise.
With a slight abuse of notation, in the following we refer to
the languages L, L-, T, and T- extended with the corresponding
taint-tracking mechanisms outlined above whenever we talk about
speculative safety. That is, for speculative safety, programs in L, L-,
T, and T- produce traces λσ of tainted labels λσ , where taints σ are
computed as described above.
Property. Speculative safety ensures that whole programsW gen-
erate only safe (S) actions in their traces. As we show later, SS
security guarantees depend on the underlying language (and on its
taint-tracking mechanism).
Definition 3.6 (Speculative Safety (SS)).
⊢ W : SS def= ∀λσ ∈ Beh(W ).∀ασ ∈ λσ . σ ≡ S
A component P is RSS if it upholds SS when linked against
arbitrary valid attackers (Definition 3.7).
Definition 3.7 (Robust Speculative Safety (RSS)).
⊢ P : RSS def= ∀A. if ⊢ A : atk then ⊢ A [P] : SS
Example 3.8 (Listing 1 is RSS in L and not in T). The code of
Listing 1 is RSS in L because σpc is always S and, therefore, all
actions are tainted as S. The code, however, is neither RSS in T
nor in T-. For this, consider the trace from Example 2.2. The taint-
tracking mechanism taints the actions as follows:
tsp = call get 8?S · if(1)S · read(A[8])S · read(B[A[8]])U · rlbS · ret!S
The trace contains an unsafe action corresponding to the second
memory access. This happens because the action has been generated
speculatively (that is, σpc is U) and it depends on data retrieved
from the private heap (which T’s taint-tracking taints as U). 
Security Guarantees. Similarly to SNI, the security guarantees of
SS depend on the underlying language. As expected, RSS trivially
holds for L and L- since they only produce labels tainted S.
Theorem 3.9 (All L and L- programs are RSS).
∀P. ⊢ P : RSS(L) and ⊢ P : RSS(L-)
In contrast, RSS’ guarantees are different for T and T-, which are
equipped with distinct taint tracking mechanisms.
RSS(T) is a strict over-approximation of RSNI(T) (and, thus, of
speculative non-interference in terms of [27, 28]) and its preserva-
tion through compilation is easier to prove than RSNI(T)-preservation.
Theorem 3.10 (RSS(T) over-approximates RSNI(T)).
1) ∀P. if ⊢ P : RSS(T) then ⊢ P : RSNI(T)
2) ∃P. ⊢ P : RSNI(T) and ⊬ P : RSS(T)
To understand point 1, observe that RSS(T) ensures that only safe
observations are produced by a program P. This, in turn, ensures
that no information originating from the private heap is leaked
through speculatively-executed instructions in P. Therefore, P satis-
fies RSNI(T) because everything except the private heap is visible to
the attacker, i.e., there are no additional leaks due to speculatively-
executed instructions.
To understand point 2, consider get_nc from Listing 2, which
always accesses B[A[y]]. This code is RSNI(T) because states that can
be distinguished by the traces can also be distinguished by their non-
speculative projections, i.e., speculatively-executed instructions do
not leak additional information. However, it is not RSS(T) because
speculative memory accesses will produce U actions.
1 void get_nc (int y)
2 if (y < size) then B[A[y] ] else B[A[y] ]
Listing 2: Code that is RSNI but not RSS.
RSS(T-), in contrast, is a strict over-approximation of RSNI(T-)
(and, therefore, of weak speculative non-interference in terms of [28]).
Theorem 3.11 (RSS(T-) over-approximates RSNI(T-)).
1) ∀P. if ⊢ P : RSS(T-) then ⊢ P : RSNI(T-)
2) ∃P. ⊢ P : RSNI(T-) and ⊬ P : RSS(T-)
Finally, it is easy to see that any RSS(T) program is also RSS(T-)
since all actions tainted S by the taint-tracking of T are tainted S
also by the taint-tracking of T-.
Theorem 3.12 (RSS(T) Implies RSS(T-)).
∀P. if ⊢ P : RSS(T) then ⊢ P : RSS(T-)
4 COMPILER CRITERIA FOR SECURE
SPECULATION
We now introduce our secure compilation criteria: robust speculative
safety preservation (RSSP , Section 4.1), which preserves RSS, and
robust speculative non-interference preservation (RSNIP , Section 4.2),
which preserves RSNI. We conclude by discussing how compilers
can be proven secure or insecure using these criteria (Section 4.3).
As before, criteria can be instantiated using pairs of languages
L-T or L--T-. Criteria instantiated with the strong languages (say
RSSP(L,T)) are indicated with a + (that is, RSSP+). Those instantiated
with weak languages (say RSNIP(L-,T-)) are indicated with a - (that
is, RSNIP-). When we omit the ‘sign’, we refer to both criteria. For
simplicity, we only present the strong criteria (for L-T), weak ones
are defined identically (but for L−-T−).
4.1 Robust Speculative Safety Preservation
The first criterion is clear: a compiler preserves RSS if given a source
component that is RSS, the compiled counterpart is also RSS.
Definition 4.1 (RSSP+).
⊢ J·K : RSSP+ def= ∀P ∈ L. if ⊢ P : RSS(L) then ⊢ JPK : RSS(T)
Definition 4.1 is a “property-ful” criterion since it explicitly refers
to the preserved property [3, 4]. Proving a “property-ful” criterion,
however, can be fairly complex. Fortunately, it is generally possible
to turn a “property-ful” definition into an equivalent “property-free”
one [3, 4, 51], which come in so-called backtranslation form with
established proof techniques [2, 4, 13, 45, 49, 51].
To state the equivalence of these criteria, we introduce a cross-
language relation between traces of the two languages, which spec-
ifies when two possibly different traces have the same “meaning”.
Our property-free security criterion (RSSC, Definition 4.2) states
that a compiler is RSSC if for any target-level attacker A that gener-
ates a traceλσ , we can build a source-level attackerA that generates
a trace λσ that is related to λσ . A source trace λσ and a target trace
λσ are related (denoted with λσ ≈λσ ) if the target trace contains all
the actions of the source trace, plus possible interleavings of safe (S)
actions (Rules Trace-Relation-Safe and Trace-Relation-Safe-Heap).
All other actions must be the same (i.e., ≡, Rules Trace-Relation-
Same and Trace-Relation-Same-Heap).
(Trace-Relation-Same)
λσ ≈λσ ασ ≡ ασ
λσ · ασ ≈λσ · ασ
(Trace-Relation-Same-Heap)
λσ ≈λσ δσ ≡ δσ
λσ · δσ ≈λσ · δσ
(Trace-Relation-Safe)
λσ ≈λσ
λσ ≈λσ · α S
(Trace-Relation-Safe-Heap)
λσ ≈λσ
λσ ≈λσ · δS
We are now ready to formalise RSSC, which intuitively states
that compiled programs produce the same traces as their source
counterparts with possibly additional safe actions. Crucially, RSSC
is equivalent to RSSP (Theorem 4.3), this result implies that our
choice for the trace relation is correct; a relation that is too strong
or too weak would not let us prove this equivalence.
Definition 4.2 (RSSC+).







then ∃A, λσ .Beh(A [P]) = λσ and λσ ≈λσ
Theorem 4.3 (RSSP and RSSC are eqivalent).
∀J·K. ⊢ J·K : RSSP+ ⇐⇒ ⊢ J·K : RSSC+
∀J·K. ⊢ J·K : RSSP- ⇐⇒ ⊢ J·K : RSSC-
Definition 4.2 requires providing an existentially-quantified source
attacker A. The general proof technique for these criteria is called
backtranslation [4, 50], and it can either be attacker-based [13, 21,
45] or trace-based [2, 49, 51]. The distinction tells us what quanti-
fied element one can use to build the source attacker A, either the
target attacker A or the trace λσ respectively. In our proofs, we
will use an attacker-based backtranslation.
4.2 Robust Speculative Non-Interference
Preservation
Here, we only present a property-ful criterion for the preservation
of RSNI (Definition 4.4). The reason is that we only directly prove
that compilers do not attain RSNIP . This kind of proof is simple
already (Corollary 4.5), and we do not need a property-free criterion.
Definition 4.4 (RSNIP+).
⊢ J·K : RSNIP+ def= ∀P ∈ L. if ⊢ P : RSNI(L) then ⊢ JPK : RSNI(T)
Corollary 4.5 (⊬ J·K : RSNIP+).
⊬ J·K : RSNIP+ def= ∃P ∈ L. ⊢ P : RSNI(L) and ⊬ JPK : RSNI(T)
Let us now unfold the corollary in order to understand what must be
proven to show that a compiler is not RSNIP+. The crux is the second
clause of the corollary, which gets unfolded to the following. Recall
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That is, we need to find a program P and an attacker A that violate
RSNI. Finding these existentially-quantified program (and attacker)
may be hard. Fortunately, failed attempts at proving RSSC often pro-
vide hints for how to do this. □
We remark that the insecurity part of our methodology is used
to show its completeness w.r.t. vulnerability to Spectre v1 attacks.
Unfortunately, one still has to manually come up with the insecure
counterexample and verify that it is not RSNI.
4.3 A Methodology for Provably-(In)Secure
Countermeasures
To prevent speculative leaks, secure compilers should produce tar-
get programs that satisfy RSNI (cf. Section 3.1) whereas insecure
compilers will produce some programs that fail to achieve RSNI.
In this section, we show how to combine the results from the pre-
vious sections to derive exactly these facts about compilers; we
depict this with the two chains of implications below. The first
one (1) lists the assumptions (black dashed lines) and logical steps
(theorem-annotated implications) to conclude compiler security
while the second one (2) lists assumptions and logical steps for
compiler insecurity. For simplicity, the diagram focuses on secu-
rity definitions and compiler criteria for L and T. There are similar
chains of implications for L- and T- that use Theorem 3.11 instead
of Theorem 3.10.
⊢ P : RSS(L)
⊢ JPK : RSS(T)
∀P ∈ L
⊢ JPK : RSNI(T)
⊢ J·K : RSSP+
Theorem 3.10
⊢ J·K : RSSC+
Theorem 4.3 ⊢ P : RSNI(L)
∃P ∈ L
⊬JPK : RSNI(T)
⊬ J·K : RSNIP+
(1) (2)
To show security (1), we need to prove that any compiled compo-
nent is RSNI in the target language. Rather than directly reasoning
about RSNI, we rely on RSS, which over-approximates RSNI (cf.
Theorem 3.10). This significantly simplifies our security proofs
since it allows us to reason about single traces rather than pairs of
traces. Thus, it suffices to show that any compiled component is
RSS in the target. This can be obtained by (i) an RSSP+ compiler so
long as (ii) any P is RSS in the source. By Theorem 4.3, for point (i)
it is sufficient to show that the compiler is RSSC+. Point (ii) holds
for any P (Theorem 3.9). This direction highlights how RSS really
is a working security definition that simplifies proving the more
precise, semantic security definition which is RSNI.
To show insecurity (2), we need to prove that there exists a
compiled component that is not RSNI in the target language. For
this, we show (A) that the compiler is not RSNIP+ given that (B) the
source component Pwas RSNI in the source. To show (A), we follow
Corollary 4.5, whereas point (B) holds for any P (Theorem 3.9).
Our security criteria, instantiated for the strong (L-T) and weak
(L--T-) languages, provide a way of characterizing the security
guarantees of any countermeasure J·K, which is what we do next.
In particular, showing that J·K is RSSC+ ensures that compiled code
has no speculative leaks. Similarly, showing that J·K is RSSC- (and
not RSNIP+) ensures that compiled code does not leak information
about speculatively-accessed data, i.e., it would prevent Spectre
attacks. Finally, showing that J·K is not RSNIP- implies that compiled
code leaks speculatively accessed data, like in Spectre attacks.
Preservation or Enforcement? RSNIP and RSSP focus on preserving
the related security property. Since their premise is always satisfied,
we could also state them in terms of enforcing RSNI and RSS over
compiled programs. We choose against this to be able to reuse
established compiler theory [39], and since it is unclear how to
prove Theorem 4.3 with enforcement statements.
5 COUNTERMEASURES ANALYSIS
In this section, we characterise the security guarantees of the main
Spectre v1 countermeasures implemented by compiler vendors:
insertion of speculation barriers (lfence) and speculative load
hardening (slh). For this, we develop formal models that capture
the key aspects of these countermeasures as implemented by the
Microsoft Visual C++ compiler [47] (MSVC, Section 5.1), the In-
tel C++ compiler [33] (ICC, Section 5.2), and the Clang compiler
(Section 5.3), and we analyze their guarantees using our secure
compilation criteria. We continue the section with an overview of
our proofs (Section 5.4). We conclude by discussing our analysis’
results (Section 5.5). For space constraints, compiled snippets, their
formalisation, and full security proofs can be found in [52].
5.1 MSVC is Insecure
Inserting speculation barriers—the lfence x86 instruction—after
branch instructions is a simple countermeasure against Spectre
v1 [31, 33, 47]. This instruction stops speculative execution at the
price of significant performance overhead.
MSVC implements a countermeasure that tries to minimize the
number of lfences by selectively determining which branches to
patch [47].
1
However, MSVC fails in inserting some necessary
lfences, thereby producing insecure code that is not RSNI(T-) and
that is vulnerable to Spectre-style attacks.
To show this, we follow Corollary 4.5 and provide a program
that is RSNI(L-) and its compilation is not RSNI(T-). The program
we consider, which is RSNI(L-) (Theorem 3.9), is given in Listing 3.
1 void get (int y)
2 if (y < size) then
3 if (A[y] == 0) then
4 temp = B[0];
Listing 3: A variant of the classic Spectre v1 snippet
(Example 10 from [36]).
As shown in [27, 36], MSVC fails in injecting an lfence after the
first branch instruction. As a result, the compiled target program
is identical to Listing 3, and it speculatively leaks whether A[y] is
0 through the branch statement in line 3, i.e., it violates RSNI(T-).
We refer to [27, 36] for additional examples of MSVC’s insecurity.
5.2 ICC is Secure
The Intel C++ compiler also implements a countermeasure that
inserts lfences after each branch instruction [33].2
We model this countermeasure with J·Kf , a homomorphic com-
piler that takes a component in L and translates all of its subparts
to T. Its key feature is inserting an lfence statement at the begin-
ning of every then and else branch of compiled code. All other
statements are left unmodified by the compiler.
Jifz e then s else s′Kf= ifz JeKf then {lfence; JsKf }else {lfence; Js′Kf }
It should come at no surprise that J·Kf is RSSC+ (Theorem 5.1). In T,
the only source of speculation are branches (Rule E-T-speculate-if)
but any branch, whether it evaluates to true or false, will execute an
lfence (Rule E-T-speculate-lfence), triggering a rollback (Rule E-T-
speculate-rollback). Since compiled code performs no action during
speculation, it can only perform actions when the program counter
is tainted as S, which makes all actions S. These actions are easy to
relate to their source-level counterparts since they are generated
according to the non-speculative semantics.
Theorem 5.1 (ICC is secure for L-T). ⊢ J·Kf : RSSC+
1
The countermeasure can be activated with the /Qspectre flag.
2
The countermeasure can be activated with flag: -mconditional-branch=all-fix
5.3 Speculative Load Hardening
Clang implements a countermeasure called speculative load hard-
ening [16] (SLH) that works as follows:
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• Compiled code keeps track of a predicate bit that records
whether the processor is mis-speculating (predicate bit set to 1)
or not (predicate bit set to 0). This is done by replicating the be-
haviour of all branch instructions using branch-less cmov instruc-
tions, which do not trigger speculation. SLH-compiled code tracks
the predicate bit inter-procedurally by storing it into the most-
significant bits of the stack pointer register, which are always un-
used. Note that when all speculative transactions have been rolled
back, the predicate bit is reset to 0 by the rollback capabilities of
the processor.
• Compiled code uses the predicate bit to initialise a mask
whose usage is detailed below. At the beginning of a function,
SLH-compiled code retrieves the predicate bit from the stack and
uses it to initialize a mask either to 0xF..F if predicate bit is 1 or
to 0x0..0 otherwise. During the computation, SLH-compiled code
uses cmov instructions to conditionally update the mask and pre-
serve the invariant that mask = 0xF..F if code is mis-speculating
and mask = 0x0..0 otherwise. Before returning from a function,
SLH-compiled code pushes the most-significant bit of the current
mask to the stack; thereby preserving the predicate bit.
• All inputs to control-flow and store instructions are hardened
by masking their values with mask (i.e., by or-ing their value with
mask). That is, whenever code is mis-speculating (i.e., mask =
0xF..F) the inputs to these statements are “F-ed” to 0xF..F, oth-
erwise they are left unchanged. This prevents speculative leaks
through control-flow and store statements.
• The outputs of memory loads instructions are hardened by
or-ing their value with mask. So, when code is mis-speculating,
the result of load instructions is “F-ed” to 0xF..F. This prevents
leaks of speculatively-accessed memory locations. Inputs to load
instructions, however, are not masked.
In the following, we analyse the security guarantees of SLH.
5.3.1 SLH is not RSNIP+. We show that SLH is not RSNIP+, i.e., it
does not preserve (strong) speculative non-interference and thus it
allows speculative leaks of data retrieved non-speculatively.
Following Corollary 4.5, we do this by providing a program that
is RSNI(L) and that is compiled to a program that is not RSNI(T).
The program in Listing 4 differs from Listing 1 in that the first
memory access is performed non-speculatively (line 2).
1 void get (int y)
2 x = A[y];
3 if (y < size) then
4 temp = B[x];
Listing 4: Another variant of the classic Spectre v1 snippet.
In its compilation, SLH hardens the value of A[y] using the mask
retrieved from the stack pointer. When the get function is invoked
non-speculatively, the mask is set to 0x0..0 and A[y] is not masked.
Thus, speculatively-executing the load in (the compiled counter-
part of) line 4 leaks the value of A[y], which might differ for low-
equivalent states, and violates RSNI(T).
3
SLH can be activated with flag: -mllvm -x86-speculative-load-hardening
5.3.2 SLH is RSSC-. We now show that SLH is RSSC-, that is, it
prevents leaks of speculatively-accessed data.
We formalise SLH using the J·Ks compiler, whose most inter-
esting cases are given in the top of Figure 1. The compiler takes
components in L- and outputs compiled code in T-. The compiler
keeps track of the predicate bit in a cross-procedural way, masks
inputs to control-flow and store instructions, and masks outputs of
load instructions as described before.
Since the stack pointer is not accessible from an attacker residing
in another process, J·Ks tracks the predicate bit in the first location
of the private heap which attackers cannot access. So location −1 is
initialised to 1 (false) and updated to 0whenever we are speculating.
Compiled code must update the predicate bit right after the then
and else branches (statements −1 :=pr · · ·). Since location −1 is
reserved for the predicate bit, all private memory accesses and the
private heap are shifted by 1.
Several statements may leak information to the attacker: calling
attacker functions, reading and writing the public and private heap,
and branching. For function calls, memory writes, and branch in-
structions, J·Ks masks the input to these statement. That is, we eval-
uate the sub-expressions used in those statements and store them
in auxiliary variables (called xf ). Then, we look up the predicate
bit (via statement let pr = rdpr −1 in · · ·) and store it in variable
pr. Finally, using the conditional assignment, we set the result of
those expressions to 0 (tainted S as all constants) if the predicate
bit is 0 (true). In contrast, for memory reads, J·Ks masks the output
of these statement based on the predicate bit stored in pr.
As stated in Theorem 5.2, programs compiled with SLH are
RSS(T-) and, therefore, RSNI(T-) (Theorem 3.10). Hence, they are
free of leaks of speculatively-accessed data, which is sufficient to
stop Spectre-style leaks like those in Listing 1.
Theorem 5.2 (SLH is secure for L--T-). ⊢ J·Ks : RSSC-
J·Ks is RSSC- for two reasons. First, location −1 (and thus variable
pr where its contents are loaded) always correctly tracks whether
speculation is ongoing or not. This holds because location −1 and
pr cannot be tampered by the attacker, the compiler initializes −1
correctly, and the assignments right after the branches correctly
update location −1 (via the negation of the guard xf ). Second, when-
ever speculation is happening, the result of load operations is set to
a constant 0 whose taint is S. So, computations happening during
speculation either depend on data loaded non-speculatively, which
are tainted as S by the taint-tracking of T-, or on masked values,
which are also tainted S. Speculative actions are tainted with glb (⊔)
of data taint (S) and pc taint (U). Since S ⊔U = S (see Section 3.2),
speculative actions are tainted S, satisfying RSS(T-).
5.3.3 Making SLH More Secure. We now show how to modify SLH
to prevent all speculative leaks. We do so by introducing strong SLH
(SSLH for short) that differs from standard SLH in that it masks the
input (rather than the output) of memory read operations (as such,
we expect an implementation of SSLH to have a small overhead
caused by the newly introduced data dependencies that might de-
lay some masked loads). We model SSLH using the J·Kss compiler
that takes components in L and outputs compiled code in T. J·Kss
differs from J·Ks in how memory reads are compiled (Figure 1).
The compiler masks the input of memory loads by evaluating the
sub-expressions and storing them in auxiliary variables (called xf ),
retrieving the predicate bit and storing it in variable pr, condition-
ally masking the value of xf , and, finally, performing the memory
access using xf as address.
As stated in Theorem 5.3, programs compiled using SSLH are
RSS(T) and, thanks to Theorem 3.10, RSNI(T). Therefore, they are
free of all speculative leaks.
Theorem 5.3 (SSLH is secure for L-T). ⊢ J·Kss : RSSC+
J·Kss satisfies RSSC+ for two reasons. First, the compiler correctly
tracks whether speculation is ongoing (cf. §5.3.2). Second, when-
ever speculation is happening, the result of any possibly-leaking
expression is set to a constant 0 whose taint is S. That is, labels
during speculation are tainted as S, and RSS(T) holds.
5.3.4 Non-interprocedural SLH is insecure. We conclude by show-
ing that the non-interprocedural variant of SLH, where the predi-
cate bit is set to 0 at the beginning of each function, is insecure and
does not prevent all speculative leaks.
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Consider the program in
Listing 5 that splits the memory accesses of A and B of the classical
Spectre v1 snippet across functions get and get_2.
1 void get (int y)
2 x = A[y];
3 if (y < size) then get_2 (x);
4
5 void get_2 (int x) temp = B[x];
Listing 5: Inter-procedural variant of Spectre v1 snippet [42]
Once compiled, get starts the speculative execution (line 3), then
the compiled code corresponding to get_2 is executed speculatively.
However, the predicate bit of get_2 is set to 0 upon calling the
function. Hence, the memory access corresponding to B[x] is not
masked leading to the leak of x (which contains A[y]), so the target
program violates RSNI(T-).
It is also possible to secure the non-interprocedural variant of
SLH. We model NISLH as J·Ksn by having the predicate bit initialized
at the beginning of each function to 1 (false) in a local variable
pr. As before, compiled code updates pr after every branching
instruction. To ensure that pr correctly captures whether we are
mis-speculating, we place an lfence as the first instruction of every
compiled function.
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ifz xf then let pr=pr ∨ ¬xf in JsK
s
n
else let pr=pr ∨ xf in Js
′Ksn
This compiler is also RSSC- since (1) it correctly tracks whether
we are speculating (this time using local variable pr rather than
location −1 as in J·Ks), (2) speculation across function boundaries
is blocked by lfence statements, and (3) masking is done as in J·Ks .
Theorem 5.4 (The NISLH compiler is RSSC-). ⊢ J·Ksn :RSSC
-
In a similar way, one can construct a secure, non-interprocedural
version of J·Kss that satisfies RSSC+.
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JH,−n 7→ v : UKs = JHKs,−JnKs − 1 7→ JvKs : U
Jifz e then s else s′Ks = let xf=JeK
s in let pr = rdpr −1 in let xf = 0 (if pr) in ifz xf then −1 :=pr pr ∨ ¬xf ; JsK






s+1 in let x′f=Je
′Ks in let pr = rdpr −1 in let xf = 0 (if pr) in let x
′
f = 0 (if pr) in xf :=pr x
′
fq
let x = rdpr e in s
ys
= let xf=JeK
s+1 in let pr = rdpr −1 in let x = rdpr xf in let x = 0 (if pr) in JsK
s
q
let x = rdpr e in s
yss
= let xf=JeK
ss+1 in let pr = rdpr −1 in let xf = 0 (if pr) in let x = rdpr xf in JsK
ss
Figure 1: Key bits of the SLH compiler J·Ks (above). The SSLH compiler J·Kss (below) differs in the compilation of memory reads.
5.4 How to Prove RSSC
We now illustrate the backtranslation proof technique used to prove
SLH-related countermeasures secure. Our backtranslation is a sim-
ple adaptation of the general backtranslation proof technique [51].
To prove that a compiler is RSSC, we backtranslate a target attacker
(A) to create a source attacker (A =⟨⟨A⟩⟩) so that they produce traces
related by the relation of Section 4. Our backtranslation function
(⟨⟨·⟩⟩), which is the same for all proofs, homomorphically translates
target heaps, functions, statements etc. into source ones.
We depict our proof approach in Figure 2. There, circles and
contoured statements represent source and target states. A black
dotted connection between source and target states indicates that
they are related; dashed target states are not related to any source
state. In our setup, execution happens either on the attacker side or






















Figure 2: Diagram depicting the proof that J·Ks is RSSC-.
To prove that source and target traces are related, we set up a
cross-language relation between source and target states and prove
that reductions both preserve this relation and generate related
traces. The state relation we use is strong: a source state is related
to a target one if the latter is a singleton stack and all the sub-part of
the state are identical, i.e., heaps bind the same locations to the same
values and bindings bind the same variables to the same values. To
reason about attacker reductions, we use a lock-step simulation: we
show that starting from related states, if A does a step, then ⟨⟨A⟩⟩
does the same step and ends up in related states (yellow areas). To
reason about component reductions, we adapt a reasoning from
compiler correctness results [12, 39]. That is, if s steps and emits
a trace, then JsKs does one or more steps and emits a trace such
that both ending states and traces are related (green areas, related
traces are connected by black-dotted lines). This proof is straight-
forward except for the compilation of ifz e then s else s′ since it
triggers speculation in T (grey area). After Jifz e then s else s′Ks is
executed, speculation starts and the cross-language state relation
is temporarily broken (the stack of target states is not a singleton,
so the cross-language state relation cannot hold). Speculative exe-
cution continues for w steps in both attacker and compiled code
and generating a trace λσ . We then prove that λσ is related to the
empty source trace because all actions in λσ are tainted S, and so
they do not leak. This fact follows from proving that while speculat-
ing, bindings always contain S values and therefore any generated
action is S. In turn, this follows from proving that pr correctly cap-
tures if speculation is ongoing or not and that the mask is S. As
mentioned, both of these hold for J·Ks and J·Kss , so they are secure.
The compiler J·Kf can be proved secure in a simpler way since
speculative reductions immediately trigger an lfence, which rolls
the speculation back (the speculation window w is 0) reinstating
the cross-language state relation right away.
5.5 Summary
Our security analysis is the first rigorous characterization of the
security guarantees provided by Spectre v1 compiler countermea-
sures, and it complements existing results that focus on selected
code snippets [27, 36]. The table below depicts the results of our
analysis in terms of the security properties satisfied by compiled
programs. There, • denotes that all compiled programs satisfy the
criterion and ◦ denotes that some compiled programs violates it.
RSNI (T) RSNI (T-)
lfence(MSVC), SLH-no-interp ◦ ◦
lfence(ICC)/J·Kf , SSLH/J·Kss • •
SLH(Clang)/J·Ks , NISLH/J·Ksn ◦ •
The main findings of our security analysis are summarized below:
• The lfence countermeasure implemented in MSVC, denoted
lfence(MSVC), is insecure. It violates RSNIP- and produces pro-
grams that are not speculatively non-interference, i.e., that violate
both RSNI (T) and RSNI (T-). Hence, compiled programs still contain
speculative leaks and might be vulnerable to Spectre attacks.
• The lfence countermeasure implemented in ICC, denoted
lfence(ICC) and modelled by J·Kf , is secure. The model satisfies
RSSP+ (Theorem 5.1) and, as a result, produces only compiled pro-
grams that satisfy speculative non-interference, that is, RSNI(T).
Hence, compiled programs are free of speculative leaks.
• The speculative load hardening countermeasure implemented
in Clang, denoted SLH(Clang) and modelled by J·Kss is secure for
L--T-. The model satisfies RSSP- (Theorem 5.2) and, as a result, pro-
duces only compiled programs that satisfy weak speculative non-
interference, that is, RSNI(T-). Hence, compiled programs are free of
speculatively leaks that involve speculatively-accessed data. While
this is sufficient for preventing Spectre-style attacks, compiled pro-
grams may still speculatively leak data retrieved non-speculatively,
whichmight result in breaking properties like constant-time (see [28]).
• The strong variant of SLH, denoted SSLH and modelled by J·Kss
is secure for L-T. The model satisfies RSSP+ (Theorem 5.3) and pro-
duces compiled programs that satisfy speculative non-interference,
that is, RSNI(T). Thus, compiled programs have no speculative leaks.
• Non-interprocedural SLH, denoted SLH-no-interp, is inse-
cure. It violates RSNIP- and produces programs that violate both
RSNI (T) and RSNI (T-). Hence, compiled programs might still be
vulnerable to Spectre attacks.
• Non-interprocedural SLH can be made secure as we show in
Section 5.3.4. This variant, denoted NISLH and modelled by J·Ksn, is
secure for L--T- and it produces programs that are free of specula-
tively leaks involving speculatively-accessed data.
Additional security guarantees. In addition to RSNIP , the secure
compilers J·Kf , J·Ks , J·Kss , and J·Ksn also preserve the non-speculative
behavior of source programs. That is, if two source programsW and
W′ produce the same traces, then their compiled counterparts pro-
duce traces with the same non-speculative projection. This directly
follows from the compilers only modifying the speculative behavior
of programs, either through lfences or conditional masking.
By combining RSNIP with the preservation of non-speculative
behaviors, we can derive an additional security guarantee for our
compilers: preservation of non-interference. For simplicity, we only
focus on whole programs and we use J·Kf as an example; the same
argument applies to J·Ks , J·Kss , and J·Ksn. We say that a programW is
non-interferent (NI) if all programsW ′ that differ fromW only in the
private heap (i.e., they are low-equivalent) produce the same traces
as W . Given a source program W ∈ L that is NI, we obtain that
JWKf is NI if we restrict ourselves to the non-speculative projection
of traces since JWKf preserves the non-speculative behavior ofW.
Since JWKf is RSNI(T), the full traces do not leak more than their
non-speculative projections and thus JWKf is also non-interferent.
The security guarantees of NI depend on the underlying lan-
guage. For strong languages L-T, NI ensures that programs are
constant-time with respect to the private heap (in L, we have classi-
cal constant-time [8, 44] while in T we have speculative constant-
time [17]). Indeed, information from the private heap cannot influ-
ence the traces where read(n), write(n), and if(v) actions corre-
spond to the standard constant-time observer. For the weak lan-
guages L--T-, NI ensures a form of sandboxing where programs (1)
cannot access information from the private heap non-speculatively
(because reading values from the private heap violates NI through
actions read(n 7→ v)), and (2) cannot speculatively leak informa-
tion about the private heap. We leave exploring these additional
security results as future work.
6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
Lifting our analysis to real CPUs is only valid to the extent that our
attacker model and speculative semantics capture the target system.
Our attacker observes the location of memory accesses and the
outcome of control-flow statements. This attacker model offers a
good trade-off between precision and simplicity [8, 44], and it has
proven to capture interesting microarchitectural leaks, like those
resulting from caches and port contention. Other classes of microar-
chitectural leaks, like those resulting from internal buffers [63] or
hardware prefetchers [26], might not be captured by our model.
We also assume that attackers cannot access the private heap
since there can be no protection against same-process attackers.
This can be achieved by running attacker and component in sepa-
rate processes and leveraging OS-level memory protection.
Finally, the semantics of our target languages are adequate to rea-
son only about Spectre v1-style attacks. These semantics ignore the
effects of out-of-order execution. As a result, they cannot be used to
reason about countermeasures that rely only on data dependencies
to restrict speculatively executed instructions [46]. For a similar
reason, our analysis of SLHmight be too pessimistic in that the data
dependencies resulting from the injected masking operations might
effectively limit the scope of speculative execution. Our semantics
also ignore other sources of speculation (e.g., indirect jumps) that
are exploited by other Spectre variants, as we discuss next.
Beyond Spectre v1. Spectre v1 (also called Spectre-PHT) is just
one of the (many) Spectre variants, we recount other variants below
and discuss how to extend this work to reason about them.
• Spectre BTB [37] exploits speculation over indirect jump in-
structions. The retpoline compiler countermeasure [32] replaces
indirect jumps with a return-based trampoline that leads to code
that perform busywaiting. As a result, the speculated jump executes
no code and thus cannot leak anything.
• Spectre-RSB [41], in contrast, exploits speculation over return
addresses (through ret instructions). To prevent it, Intel deployed a
microcode update [32] that renders retpoline a valid countermeasure
also against Spectre-RSB [15].
• Spectre-STL [30] exploits speculation over data dependencies
between in-flight store and load operations. To mitigate it, ARM
introduced a dedicated SSBB speculation barrier to prevent store
bypasses that could be injected by compilers.
To reason about these Spectre variants, we need to extend the
speculative semantics of T to capture the new kinds of specula-
tive execution; this is analogous to other semantics [9, 17, 43, 64].
Crucially, the traces must capture events that are meaningful for
the related variant (e.g., reads and writes for Spectre-STL, returns
for Spectre-RSB). These actions are already present in traces of T,
so the new semantics can reuse the trace model presented here.
This, in turn, ensures that we can use the secure compilation cri-
teria and trace relation from Section 4 to reason about whether
compiler-inserted countermeasures for these variants are secure or
not. Any proof that countermeasures for these variants are RSSP
should follow the overview in Section 5.4. Specifically, proofs for
retpoline would follow the approach of Figure 2 since speculative
execution gets diverted to code that does not produce observations
(we provide an in-depth discussion on retpoline in the companion
report [52]). In contrast, reasoning about SSBB would be similar
to reasoning about J·Kf since SSBBs instructions act as speculation
barriers. We leave investigating these topics in detail for future
work.
7 RELATEDWORK
Speculative execution attacks. Many attacks analogous to Spec-
tre [35, 37] exist; they differ in the exploited speculation sources [30,
38, 41], the covert channels [57, 59, 62], or the target platforms [19].
We refer the reader to [15] for a survey of existing attacks.
Speculative semantics These semantics model the effects of specu-
latively-executed instructions. Several semantics [9, 17, 28, 43, 64]
explicitly model microarchitectural details like multiple pipeline
stages, reorder buffers, caches, and predictors. These semantics are
significantly more complex than ours (which is inspired by [27]),
and they would lead to much harder proofs.
Security definition against Spectre attacks SNI [27] has been used as
security definition against speculative leaks also by [9, 28]. Cheang
et al. [18] propose trace property-dependent observational determin-
ism, a property similar to SNI. Cauligi et al. [17] present specula-
tive constant-time (SCT), i.e., constant-time w.r.t. the speculative
semantics. Differently from SNI, SCT captures leaks under the non-
speculative and the speculative semantics, and it is inadequate for
reasoning about countermeasures that only modify a program’s
speculative behaviour. More generally, Guarnieri et al. [28] presents
a secure programming framework that subsumes both SNI and SCT.
Compiler countermeasures for Spectre v1 Apart from the insertion of
speculation barriers [5, 31] and SLH [16, 46], few countermeasures
for Spectre v1 exist. Replacing branch instructions with branchless
computations (using cmov and bit masking) is effective [53] but not
generally applicable. oo7 [65] is a tool that automatically patches
speculative leaks by injecting speculation barriers. However, oo7
misses some speculative leaks [27] and violates RSNIP-.
Blade [64] is a compiler countermeasure that aims at optimising
compiled code performance. It finds the minimal set of variables
that need to be masked in order to eliminate paths between sources
(i.e., speculative memory reads) and sinks (i.e., operations result-
ing in microarchitectural side-effects). Similarly to our framework,
Blade consider a source language without speculation and a tar-
get language with speculation and it preserves constant-time from
source to target [64, Corollary 1]. This is different from the compil-
ers we study, which block (classes of) speculative leaks regardless
of whether the source program is constant-time. Blade’s design
relies on fine-grained barriers whose scope are single instructions.
Since these barriers are not available in current CPUs, Blade’s pro-
totype realises them via both lfences and masking. We believe that
our framework can be applied to reason about both Blade’s design
and prototype, but we leave this for future work. The challenges
are extending the target languages with fine-grained barriers and
formalising the optimal placement of those barriers.
Recent work [27, 36] studied the security of compiler counter-
measures by inspecting specific compiled code snippets and de-
tected insecurities in MSVC. Our work extends and complements
these results by providing the first rigorous characterization of
these countermeasures’ security guarantees. In particular, we prove
the security of countermeasures for all source programs, rather
than simply detecting insecurities on specific examples.
Secure compilation RSSC and RSSP are instantiations of robustly-
safe compilation [2–4, 51]. Like [3, 51], we relate source and target
traces using a cross-language relation; however, our target language
has a speculative semantics. While program behaviors are sets of
traces due to non-determinism in [3, 4], behaviors are single traces
for our (deterministic) languages [39].
Fully abstract compilation (FAC) is a widely used secure compila-
tion criterion [24, 34, 49, 50, 55, 58]. FAC compilers must preserve
(and reflect) observational equivalence of source programs in their
compiled counterparts [1, 50]. While FAC has been used to reason
about microarchitectural side-effects [14], it is unclear whether
FAC is well-suited for speculative leaks as it would require explic-
itly modelling microarchitectural components that are modified
speculatively (like caches).
Constant-time-preserving compilation (CTPC) has been used to
show that compilers preserve constant-time [7, 10, 12]. Similarly
to RSNIP , proving CTPC requires proving the preservation of a
hypersafety property, which is more challenging than preserving
safety properties like RSS. Additionally, CTPC has been devised for
whole programs only (like SNI), and it cannot be used to reason
about countermeasures like SLH that do not preserve constant-time.
Verifying Hypersafety as Safety Verifying if a program satisfies a
2-hypersafety property [20] (like RSNI) is notoriously challeng-
ing. Approaches for this include taint-tracking [6, 56] (which over-
approximates the 2-hypersafety property with a safety property),
secure multi-execution [22] (which runs the code twice in par-
allel) and self-composition [11, 61] (which runs the code twice
sequentially). Our criteria leverage taint-tracking (RSS); we leave
investigating criteria based on the other approaches as future work.
8 CONCLUSION
The paper presented a comprehensive and precise characterization
of the security guarantees of compiler countermeasures against
Spectre v1, as well as the first proofs of security for such counter-
measures. For this, it introduced SS, a safety property implying the
absence of (classes of) speculative leaks. SS provides precise secu-
rity guarantees in that it can be instantiated to over-approximate
both strong [27] and weak [28] SNI, and it is tailored towards simpli-
fying secure compilation proofs. As a basis for security proofs, the
paper formalised secure compilation criteria capturing the robust
preservation of SS and SNI.
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A TAINT TRACKING OVERVIEW
The language semantics we devise contains two kinds of semantics
that operate in parallel: the operational semantics, presented in
the paper, and the taint tracking semantics, presented here. Thus,
technically, the top-level semantics is parametric in the taint track-
ing semantics. The semantics of strong languages L and T uses the
strong form of taint tracking while the semantics of weak languages
L- and T- uses the weak form of taint tracking. We now give an
in-depth overview of our taint-tracking semantics; see [52] for the
full models.
To add taint-tracking to our semantics, we enrich the program
state with taint information and devise a taint-tracking semantics
that determines how taint is propagated. The top-level semantic
judgement is then expressed in terms of the extended program
states. An extended state steps if its operational part steps according
to the semantics of Section 2.4 and if its taint part steps according
to the rules of the taint semantics.
We now define all the elements needed to define the extended
program states: extended heaps and extended bindings. In this
appendix, we indicate the heap, state, and bindings used by the
operational semantics with a v suffix, so the H , Ω and B from
Section 2.4 are denoted as Hv , Ωv and Bv respectively. Formally, we
indicate taint as σ ::= S | U . Extended heaps He extend heaps with
the taint of each location, whereas taint heaps Ht only track the
taint. Extended heaps He can be split/merged in their value-only
part Hv (used for the language semantics) and their taint-only part
Ht (used for taint-tracking). We denote this split as He ≡ Hv + Ht .
Just like heaps, extended variable bindings Be extend the binding
with the taint of the variable, whereas taint bindings Bt only track
the taint. Still like heaps, bindings can be split/merged as Be ≡
Bv + Bt .
Extended Heaps He ::= ∅ | He ; n 7→ v : σ where n ∈ Z
Taint Heaps Ht ::= ∅ | Ht ; n 7→ σ where n ∈ Z
Extended Bindings Be ::= ∅ | Be ; x 7→ v : σ
Taint Bindings Bt ::= ∅ | Bt ; x 7→ σ
Exended Prog. States Ωe ::= C,He,Be ▷ (s)f
Taint States Ωt ::= C,Ht ,Bv ▷ (s)f
The taint semantics follows two judgements:
• Judgment Bt ▷ e ↓ σ reads as “expression e is tainted as σ
according to the variable taints Bt ”.
• Judgement σ ;Ωt
σ ′
−−−→ Ω′t reads as “when the pc has taint
σ , state Ωt single-steps to Ω
′
t producing a (possibly empty)
action with taint σ ′”.
Below are the most representative rules for the taint tracking used
by strong languages:
(T-write-prv)
Be ▷ e ↓ n : σ Be ▷ e′ ↓ _ : σ ′′ H ′t = Ht ∪ −|n | 7→ σ
′′
σpc ;C, Ht, Be · Be ▷ e :=pr e′
σ ⊔σpc
−−−−−−−−→ C, H ′t , Be · Be ▷ skip
(T-read-prv)
B ▷ e ↓ n : σ ′ na = −|n | Ht (na ) = σ ′′ σ = σ ′′ ⊓σ ′
σpc ;C, Ht, Be · Be ▷ let x = rdpr e in s
σ ⊔σpc
−−−−−−−−→
C, Ht, Be · Be ∪ x 7→ 0 : U ▷ s
Writing to the private heap (Rule T-write-prv) taints the location
(−|n|) with the taint of the written expression (σ ′′). In contrast,
reading from the private heap (Rule T-read-prv) taints the variable
where the content is stored as unsafe (U ) and the read value is set
to 0 (this information is not used by the taint-tracking).
For taint-tracking of the weak languages, we replace Rule T-read-
prv with the one below that taints the read variable with the glb of
the taints of the pc and of the read value (σ ′ ⊔σpc) instead of U .
(T-read-prv-weak)
B ▷ e ↓ n : σ ′ na = −|n | Ht (na ) = σ ′′ σ = σ ′′ ⊓σ ′
σpc ;C, Ht, B · B ▷ let x = rdpr e in s
σ ⊔σpc
−−−−−−−−→
C, Ht, B · B ∪ x 7→ 0 : σ ′ ⊔σpc ▷ s
To correctly taint memory accesses, we need to evaluate ex-
pression e to derive the accessed location |n|; see, for instance,
Rule T-write-prv. This is why taint-tracking states Ωt contain the
full stack of bindings Bv and not just the taints Bt . The rules above
rely on a judgement Be ▷ e ↓ n : σ which is obtained by joining
the result of the expression semantics on the values of Be and of
the taint-tracking semantics on the taints of Be .
(Combine-B)
Bv + Bt ≡ Be Bv ▷ e ↓ v Bt ▷ e ↓ σ
Be ▷ e ↓ v : σ
The operational and taint single-steps from Section 2.4 are com-



















Hv + Ht ≡ He B′v + Bt ≡ Be Bv + Bt ≡ B′e
C;Hv ;Bv ▷ s + C;Ht ;Be ▷ s′ ≡ C;He ;B′e ▷ s
The operational semantics determines how states reduce (Ωv
λ
−−→ Ω′v),
whereas the taint-tracking semantics determines the action’s la-
bel and how taints are updated (S;Ωt
σ
−−→ Ω′t). As already men-
tioned, the pc taint is always safe since there is no speculation in
L. Moreover, merging states Ωv + Ωt results in ignoring the value
information accumulated in Ωt since we rely on the computation
performed by the operational semantics for values (Rule Merge-Ω).
In the speculative semantics, as for the non-speculative one, we
decouple the operational aspects from the taint-tracking ones. At
the top level, speculative program states (Σe) are defined as stacks
of extended speculation instances (Φe), which can be merged/split
in their operational (Φv) and taint (Φt) sub-parts. The operational
part (Φv) was presented in Section 2. The taint part (Φt) keeps track
of the taint part of the program state (Ωt) and the taint of the pc
(σ ). As before, Φv and Φt can be split/merged as Φe ≡ Φv + Φt.
Speculative States Σe ::= Φe
Extended Speculation Instance Φe ::= (Ωe,w,σ )
Speculation Instance Taint Φt ::= (Ωt,σ )
In the taint tracking used by the speculative semantics, similarly
to the operational one, reductions happen at the top of the stack:
Φt σ Φ
′




−−→ Ω′t Ωt ≡ C, Ht, B ▷ s; s
′
s . ifz _ then _ else _ and s . lfence
Φt · (Ωt, σ ) σ








−−→ Ω′t C ≡ F; I f < I
if B ▷ e ↓ 0 : σ then Ω′′t ≡ C, Ht, B · B ▷ s
′′′
; s′
if B ▷ e ↓ n : σ and n > 0 then Ω′′t ≡ C, Ht, B · B ▷ s
′′
; s′





′) · (Ω′′t , U)
In these rules, σ is the program counter taint which is com-
bined with the action taint σ ′ (Rules T-T-speculate-action and T-
T-speculate-if). Mis-speculation pushes a new state on top of the
stack whose program counter is tainted U denoting the beginning
of speculation (Rule T-T-speculate-if).
The two operational and taint-tracking single steps from Sec-
tion 2.6 are combined in a single reduction as follows:
(Combine-T)












This reduction is used by the big-step semantics Σe
λσ
===⇒ Σ′e that
concatenates single labels into traces, which, as before, do not
contain microarchitectural actions generated by the attacker.
